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Abstract
Recently, deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
have achieved great success in pathological image classi-
fication. However, due to the limited number of labeled
pathological images, there are still two challenges to be ad-
dressed: (1) overfitting: the performance of a CNN model
is undermined by the overfitting due to its huge amounts of
parameters and the insufficiency of labeled training data.
(2) privacy leakage: the model trained using a conventional
method may involuntarily reveal the private information of
the patients in the training dataset. The smaller the dataset,
the worse the privacy leakage.
To tackle the above two challenges, we introduce a
novel stochastic gradient descent (SGD) scheme, named pa-
tient privacy preserving SGD (P3SGD), which performs the
model update of the SGD in the patient level via a large-step
update built upon each patient’s data. Specifically, to pro-
tect privacy and regularize the CNN model, we propose to
inject the well-designed noise into the updates. Moreover,
we equip our P3SGD with an elaborated strategy to adap-
tively control the scale of the injected noise. To validate
the effectiveness of P3SGD, we perform extensive experi-
ments on a real-world clinical dataset and quantitatively
demonstrate the superior ability of P3SGD in reducing the
risk of overfitting. We also provide a rigorous analysis of
the privacy cost under differential privacy. Additionally, we
find that the models trained with P3SGD are resistant to the
model-inversion attack compared with those trained using
non-private SGD.
1. Introduction
In recent years, deep CNNs have emerged as powerful
tools for various pathological image analysis tasks, such as
∗Work performed while interning at IBM Research - China.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the model-inversion attack on ResNet-
18. (a) is the original image patch. (b) and (c) are the images
reconstructed from the model trained with non-private SGD and
P3SGD.
tissue classification [30, 10], lesion detection [17, 22], nu-
clei segmentation [38, 50, 26], etc. The superior perfor-
mance of deep CNNs usually relies on large amounts of la-
beled training data [40]. Unfortunately, the lack of labeled
pathological images for some tasks may lead to two notori-
ous issues: (1) overfitting of the CNN models [39, 42, 48]
and (2) privacy leakage [48, 33, 9, 46] of the patients.
Firstly, the performance of a CNN-based model is always
harmed by the overfitting due to its large amounts of pa-
rameters and the insufficiency of training data. Secondly,
pathological datasets usually contain sensitive information,
which can be associated with each individual patient. The
CNN-based models trained using conventional SGD may
involuntarily reveal the private information of patients ac-
cording to recent studies [48, 9]. For example, Zhang et al.
[48] show that the CNN model can easily memorize some
samples in the training dataset. Fredrikson et al. [9] pro-
pose a model-inversion attack to reconstruct images in the
training dataset. In Figure 1 (a) and (b), we demonstrate an
attacking example in our task, reconstructing the outline of
a patch in the training dataset by leveraging a well-trained
CNN model and its intermediate feature representations.
There have been numerous studies to solve either of two
issues individually. On the one hand, to reduce the risk
of overfitting in deep CNNs, previous research suggests
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adding appropriate randomness into the training phase [39,
42, 45]. For example, Dropout [39] adds randomness in
activation by randomly discarding the hidden layers’ out-
puts. DropConnect [42] adds randomness in weight param-
eters by randomly setting weights to zero during training.
On the other hand, differential privacy [5, 6] emerges as a
strong standard, which offers rigorous privacy guarantees
for algorithms applied on the sensitive database. Recent
works [1, 31] are introduced to train deep CNN models
within differential privacy. The main idea of these works
is to perturb the gradient estimation at each step of an SGD
algorithm. For example, Abadi et al. [1] use a differentially
private additive-noise mechanism on the gradient estima-
tion in an SGD. In addition, a few recent studies [33, 46]
have shown that these two seemingly unrelated issues are
implicitly relevant based on a natural intuition: “reducing
the overfitting” and “protecting the individual’s privacy”
share the same goal of encouraging a CNN model to learn
the population’s features instead of memorizing the features
of each individual.
In this paper, we propose a practical solution to alleviate
both issues in a task of pathological image classification.
In particular, we introduce a novel SGD algorithm, named
P3SGD, which injects the well-designed noise into the gra-
dient to obtain a degree of differential privacy and reduce
overfitting at the same time. It is worth noting that a patho-
logical database usually consists of a number of patients,
each of whom is further associated with a number of image
patches. We should protect the privacy in the patient level
instead of image level as in most of the previous works. To
achieve this goal, we propose to calculate the model update
upon individual patient’s data and add carefully-calibrated
Gaussian noise to the update for both privacy protection and
model regularization. The most similar work to ours is the
differentially private federated learning [25, 11], which fo-
cuses on protecting the user-level privacy. In contrast to
previous works, which use a globally fixed noise scale to
build the noisy update [1, 25, 11], we propose an elaborated
strategy to adaptively control the magnitude of the noisy up-
date. In the experiment, we show that this strategy plays a
key role in boosting performance of a deep CNN model. At
last, we provide a rigorous privacy cost analysis using the
moments accountant theorem [1].
In summary, the main contributions of our work are as
follows:
• We introduce a practical solution, named P3SGD,
to simultaneously address the overfitting and privacy
leaking issues of deep CNNs in the pathological im-
age classification. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to provide rigorous privacy guarantees
in medical image analysis tasks.
• Technically, we present a strategy to dynamically con-
trol the noisy update at each iterative step, which leads
to a significant performance gain against the state-of-
the-art methods [25, 11].
• We validate P3SGD on a real-world clinical dataset,
which is less explored in previous studies. The re-
sults demonstrate that P3SGD is capable of reducing
the risk of overfitting on various CNN architectures.
Moreover, P3SGD provides a strong guarantee that the
trained model protects the privacy of each patient’s
data, even when the attacker holds enough extra side-
information of the raw training dataset.
• We qualitatively and quantitatively demonstrate that
the CNN model trained using P3SGD is resistant to
the model-inversion attack [9] (shown in Figure 1 (c)).
2. Related Work
Regularization in CNNs In the past years, numerous reg-
ularization techniques have been proposed to improve the
generalization ability of deep CNNs [20, 39, 42, 45, 41, 12].
These works mainly fall into two categories: explicit regu-
larization and implicit (i.e., algorithmic) regularization.
For explicit regularization methods, various penalty
terms are used to constrain weight parameters. For example,
weight decay [20] uses l2-regularization to constrain the pa-
rameters of a CNN model. Another direction is to intro-
duce regularizers to decorrelate convolutional filters in deep
CNNs [44, 32], which improves the representation ability of
the intermediate features extracted by those filters.
For implicit regularization methods, the core idea is
to introduce moderate randomness in the model training
phase. For example, Dropout [39] randomly discards the
outputs of the hidden neurons in the training phase. How-
ever, Dropout is originally designed for fully-connected lay-
ers (FC). It is often less effective for convolutional lay-
ers, which limits its use in CNNs with few FC layers (e.g.,
ResNet). This is possibly caused by the fact that Dropout
discards features without taking its spatial correlation into
account (features from convolutional layers are always spa-
tially correlated) [12]. To address this problem, a few re-
cent works [41, 12] propose to inject structured noise into
the features from convolutional layers. One state-of-the-
art technique, named DropBlock [12], is specially designed
for convolutional layers, which randomly drops the features
in a sub-region. Both of Dropout and DropBlock inject
randomness into activation layers. In contrast, DisturbLa-
bel [45] adds randomness into the loss function by ran-
domly setting a part of labels to be incorrect in a training
mini-batch. Data augmentation is another form of algo-
rithmic regularization, which introduces noise into the in-
put layer by randomly transforming training images [36].
Our method can be categorized as implicit regularization.
In contrast to previous works, our approach (P3SGD) im-
poses regularization at the parameter updating phase.
Privacy-preserving Deep Learning Meanwhile, there is
an increasing concern for privacy leakage in deep learn-
ing models, since the training datasets may contain sen-
sitive information. This privacy issue has attracted many
research interests on the privacy-preserving deep learn-
ing [1, 35, 25, 11, 13, 28]. One promising direction is
to build machine learning models within differential pri-
vacy [1, 25, 28], which has been widely used in sensi-
tive data analysis as a golden standard of privacy. The
early solution is to perturb the model parameters [3, 49] or
the objective function [3, 19, 31]. However, such kind of
simple solutions cause considerable performance decreas-
ing [4, 43], the situation may become worse in the context
of deep learning. Therefore, some recent studies focus on
the gradient perturbation based methods [1, 25, 11, 28, 29].
Abadi et al. [1] propose a differentially private version of
SGD and present the moments accountant framework to
provide tighter privacy bound than previous methods. The
PATE framework [28, 29] protects the privacy via transfer-
ring knowledge to the student model, from an ensemble of
teacher models, which are trained on partitions of the train-
ing data.
Different from these works, which focus on image-level
privacy, we aim to provide patient-level privacy in specific
scenarios of pathological image analysis. The most simi-
lar works to ours are [25, 11], which extend the private
SGD into the federated learning paradigm [24]. However,
applying these approaches to the real-world medical image
data remains less explored. Moreover, these methods al-
ways lead to a performance drop compared with the models
trained using non-private SGD. In this paper, we evaluate
our method on a real-world pathological image dataset and
show that the performance drop can be addressed by care-
fully controlling the noisy update using our strategy.
There are also some studies aiming to explore the rela-
tionship between the overfitting and the privacy leakage is-
sues from the perspective of memorization [33, 46]. In this
paper, we present a practical solution to alleviate these two
related issues simultaneously.
3. Our Approach
In this section, we describe our approach in details and
provide a rigorous privacy cost analysis using the moments
accountant theorem [1].
3.1. Preliminaries
We firstly introduce some basic notations and definitions
of differential privacy corresponding to our specific task.
In our setting, the pathological image dataset can be re-
garded as a database D with Np patients. Generally speak-
ing, each patient Di consists of a number of image patches
of various tissues, i.e., Di = {(xk,yk)}Nik=1, where Ni is
the number of image patches of the i-th patient. With a
slight abuse of notations, we also denote D = ⋃Npi=1Di as
the whole set of images of all patients. Then, a basic con-
cept of image-level adjacent databases can be defined as:
two databases are adjacent if they differ in a single image-
label pair [1]. This concept is widely used for image-level
privacy protection.
However, such image-level privacy protection is insuf-
ficient for our tasks. Instead, we introduce a concept of
patient-level adjacent databases defined as follows:
Define 1 (Patient-level adjacent databases)D′ andD′′ are
adjacent: if D′ can be obtained by adding all images of
a single patient to D′′ or removing all images of a single
patient from D′′.
This definition is inspired by the prior works [25, 11], in
which the authors focus on user-level privacy. With the def-
inition of adjacent databases, we can formally define the
patient-level differential privacy as:
Define 2 (Differential privacy) A randomized algorithm
A : D → R satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy if for any
two adjacent databases D′,D′′ ⊆ D and for any subset of
outputs S ⊆ R it holds:
Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[A(D′′) ∈ S] + δ (1)
The randomized algorithm A is also known as the mech-
anism in the literature [5]. In our setting, A is the algo-
rithm used to train deep CNNs, e.g., the SGD algorithm. D
denotes the training dataset (i.e., D in our case) and R is
the parameter space of a deep CNN. Intuitively, the Equa-
tion 1 indicates that participation of one individual patient
in a training phase has a negligible effect on the final weight
parameters. Another concept is the sensitivity of a random-
ized algorithm:
Define 3 (Sensitivity) The sensitivity of a randomized algo-
rithm A is the upper-bound of ||A(D′) −A(D′′)||2, where
D′ and D′′ are any adjacent databases (see in Define 1).
To establish a randomized algorithm that satisfies differen-
tial privacy, we need to bound its sensitivity. The most used
strategy is to clip the norm of the parameter update. In next
two subsections, we will introduce the traditional SGD and
P3SGD separately, as two instances of the randomized al-
gorithm A.
3.2. Standard SGD Algorithm
We start with the standard SGD (i.e., non-private SGD)
algorithm for training a deep CNN-based classification
model. The goal of the classification is to train a CNN
model M : yˆ = f(x;θ), where yˆ is the predicted label,
and θ are the model parameters. Training of the model is to
minimize the empirical loss L(D;θ). In practice, we esti-
mate the gradient of the empirical loss on a mini-batch. We
denote the classification loss over a mini-batch as:
L(Bt;θ) = 1|Bt|
∑
(x,y)∈Bt
l(f(x;θ),y) (2)
Here, l(x,y) is the loss function, e.g., cross-entropy loss.
Bt refers to a mini-batch of images which are randomly and
independently drawn from the whole image setD. Note that
we can add an additional regularization term into Equation
2, such as l2 term. At the t-th step of the SGD algorithm,
we can update the current parameter θt as θt+1 = θt − γt ·
∇θtL(Bt;θt).
3.3. P3SGD Algorithm
Overall, our framework comprises of three components,
which are update computation, update sanitization, and pri-
vacy accumulation. Our method inherits the computing
paradigm of federated learning [24]. Moreover, to protect
the privacy, we need to inject well-designed Gaussian noise
into each step’s update, which is marked as update sani-
tization. At last, we can use the moments accountant for
privacy accumulation. The pseudo-code is depicted in Al-
gorithm 1. Next, we will describe each of these components
in details.
For update computation, at the beginning of the t-th step
of P3SGD, we randomly sample a patient batch Bt from
the database D with a sampling ratio p. Here, the notation
Bt is different from the one in Equation 2, where the Bt is
sampled from individual images instead of patients.
Then, for each patient i in the sampled batch, we perform
a back propagation to calculate gradients of the parameters
via images of the patient i. After that, we locally update
the model using the computed gradients. After we traverse
all images of this patient, we can obtain the model update
with respect to patient i. This procedure can be interpreted
as performing SGD on the local data from patient i.
In the next step, we average updates of all patients in
Bt to obtain the final update at the t-th step. Note that we
need to control the sensitivity of the total update for fur-
ther update sanitization. In practice, this is implemented by
clipping the l2 norm of the update, with respect to each in-
dividual patient (as shown in line 26 in Algorithm 1). Cu
in Algorithm 1 denotes a predefined upper-bound. Thus,
the sensitivity of the total update can be bounded by 2Cu (a
proof can be found in supplementary materials). The main
idea of update computation is implemented by a function
PatientUpdate, as shown in Algorithm 1.
To protect privacy, update sanitization needs to be per-
formed. Specifically, we use Gaussian mechanism [7] to
inject well-calibrated Gaussian noise into the original up-
date, which leads to a noisy update. The variance of in-
jected Gaussian noise is jointly determined by the upper-
Algorithm 1: P3SGD
1 Inputs:
2 Patient database: D, Empirical Loss: L.
3 Patient sampling ratio: p.
4 Noise scale set Ωz: {zi}Nzi=1.
5 Noise budget ′ for selecting update per iteration.
6 Bound of update’s norm: Cu.
7 Bound of objective function’s norm: Co.
8 Initialize θ0 randomly
9 for t ∈ [T ] do
10 Take a subset Bt of patients with sampling ration p
11 for each patient i ∈ Bt do
12 ∆it ← PatientUpdate(i,θt)
13 end
14 ∆t ← 1|Bt| (
∑
i ∆
i
t)
15 Ωσ = {σ = zCu/|Bt| : for z in Ωz}
16 Ω∆ = {∆˜ = ∆t +N (0, (σ2I)) : for σ in Ωσ}
17 ∆˜t ← NoisyUpdateSelect(Ω∆, ′,Bt,θt,L)
18 θt+1 = θt + ∆˜t
19 end
20 Function PatientUpdate(i, θt):
21 θ ← θt
22 for batch image samples b from Patient i do
23 θ ← θ − γ∇L(b;θ)
24 end
25 ∆i = θ − θt
26 ∆i = ClipNorm(∆i,Cu)
27 return ∆i
Algorithm 2: NoisyUpdateSelect
1 Function NoisyUpdateSelect(Ω, , B, θ, L):
2 Ωu = { u =−Clip(L(B;θ+ ∆), Co) : for ∆ in Ω }
3 Select ∆ with probability
exp(
u
2Co
)∑
u∈Ωu exp(
u
2Co
)
4 return ∆
bound Cu of the update’s l2 norm and the noise scale z. In
this paper, we use a common strategy to set Cu as a glob-
ally fixed value similar to prior works [1, 25]. Therefore,
the choice of a noise scale factor z is critical to train CNN
model with high performance. Previous works [1, 25] usu-
ally use a fixed noise scale throughout the training phase.
However, the fixed noise scale factor may lead to the de-
parture of the noisy update from the descent direction or
an ignorable regularization effect, because the magnitudes
of the updates may vary at different iterative steps. Thus,
we argue that the strategy that uses a fixed noise scale may
hinder the classification performance.
In this paper, we present an elaborated strategy to adap-
tively select the noise scale. This strategy is originated
from the exponential mechanism [7], which is a commonly
used mechanism to build a differentially private version of
the Argmax function. In this paper, the Argmax function
refers to select the argument which maximizes a specific
objective function. In our task, we use the negative loss
function as the objective function, and the argument is the
noisy update built upon different noise scales from the pre-
defined set Ωz . We implement this strategy as a function
NoisyUpdateSelect depicted in Algorithm 2. The prede-
fined set Ωz contains Nz noise scale factors. Increasing
Nz leads to more subtle control of the noisy update, which
further boosts the performance. However, the increase of
Nz also results in an increase of computational cost. Pre-
cisely, one more noise scale will bring about one more for-
ward computation on all images in Bt. In practice, we find
that setting Nz = 2 suffices for our task. Note that setting
Nz = 1 degenerates to the method used in [25, 11]. In the
experiments, we show this strategy is crucial to boost the
performance.
For privacy accumulation, the composition theorem can
be leveraged to compose the privacy cost at each itera-
tive step. In this paper, we make use of the moments ac-
countant [1], which can obtain tighter bound than previous
strong composition theorem [8]. Specifically, the moments
accountant is to track a bound of the privacy loss random
variable instead of a bound on the original privacy budget.
Given a randomized algorithm A, the privacy loss at output
o is defined as:
c(o;A,aux,D′ ,D′′) , log Pr[A(aux,D
′
) = o]
Pr[A(aux,D′′) = o] (3)
Then, the privacy loss random variable C(A,aux,D′ ,D′′)
is defined by evaluating the privacy loss at the outcome sam-
pled from A(D′) [28]. Here, D′ and D′′ are adjacent. aux
denotes the auxiliary information. In our P3SGD algorithm,
auxiliary information at step t is the weight parameters θt−1
at the step t − 1. The algorithm A is also known as the
adaptive mechanism in literature [1]. We can then define
the moments accountant as follows:
Mc(λ) , max
aux,D′,D′′
Mc(λ;aux,D′ ,D′′) (4)
where Mc(λ;aux,D′ ,D′′) is the moment generating func-
tion of the privacy loss random variable, which is calculated
as:
Mc(λ;aux,D′ ,D′′) , log E[exp(λC(A,aux,D′ ,D′′))]
(5)
Then, we introduce the composability and the tail bound
of moments accountant as:
Theorem 1 (Composability) Suppose that a randomized
algorithmA consists of a sequence of adaptive mechanisms
A1, . . . ,Ak where Ai :
∏i−1
j=1Rj × D
′ → Ri. The mo-
ments accountant of Ai is denoted as M ic(λ). For any λ:
Mc(λ) ≤
k∑
i=1
M ic(λ) (6)
Theorem 2 (Tail bound) For any  ≥ 0, the algorithm A
satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy for
δ = min
λ
exp(Mc(λ)− λ) (7)
Theorem 2 indicates that if the moments accountant of a
randomized algorithmA is bounded, thenA satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy. The bound of the moments accountant
for our strategy implemented in Algorithm 2 is guaranteed
by the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Given λ, the moments accountant of Algo-
rithm 2 is bounded by q · λ(λ+ 1)
2
2
.
The proof can be done using the privacy amplification [18]
and the theorem in the prior literature [2]. More details can
be found in appendix of this work.
Privacy guarantee: In this paper, privacy accumulation is
to accumulate the moments accountant’s bound at each step.
Note that privacy accumulation needs to be performed at
the noisy update selection (line 17 in Algorithm 1) and the
model update via noisy update (line 18 in Algorithm 1). For
the NoisyUpdateSelect in line 17, we can calculate a bound
via Theorem 3. For the model update in line 18, the bound
is obtained based on the property of Gaussian Mechanism
(Lemma 3 in appendix of [1]). Once we bound the mo-
ments accountant at each iterative step, we can compose
these bounds using Theorem 1. At last, the total privacy
cost is obtained based on Theorem 2. It suffices to compute
the Mc(λ) when λ ≤ 32. In practice, we use a finite set
{1, · · · , 32} following prior work [1].
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Experimental Settings
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of P3SGD on
a real-world clinical dataset. This dataset is collected by
the doctors in our team. The dataset consists of 1216 pa-
tients and each patient contains around 50 image patches.
The task we consider in this paper is glomerulus classifica-
tion, which aims to classify whether an image patch con-
tains a glomerulus or not. This task has also been studied
in a recent work [10]. We ask the doctors to manually la-
bel the image patches. For a fair comparison, we set the
Model Type # Params SGD SGD+Dropout P3SGDTraining Testing Gap Training Testing Gap Training Testing Gap
AlexNet T 60.9 M 99.87 91.58 8.29 98.97 93.13 5.84 96.85 92.74 4.11
VGG-16 T 14.7 M 99.81 92.19 7.81 99.28 94.32 4.96 96.23 93.87 2.36
ResNet-18 M 11.2 M 99.85 92.25 7.60 99.63 92.12 7.51 95.70 95.23 0.47
ResNet-34 M 21.3 M 99.23 93.19 6.04 99.16 93.22 5.94 95.80 95.34 0.46
MobileNet M 3.2 M 98.73 92.01 6.72 98.65 91.61 7.04 94.79 94.13 0.66
MobileNet v2 M 2.3 M 98.52 93.24 5.28 98.37 93.28 5.09 95.32 94.86 0.46
Table 1. Training and testing accuracies (%) of various network architectures trained with different strategies. The gap between training
and testing accuracies is used for measuring the overfitting of the CNN models.The type T/M denotes traditional/modern CNNs.
weight decay to 1e-4 and use data augmentation in all ex-
periments. Specifically, we perform data augmentation by
(1) randomly flipping input images vertically and/or hori-
zontally, and (2) performing random color jittering, includ-
ing changing the brightness and saturation of input images.
All input images are resized into 224×224, and pixel inten-
sity values are normalized into [0, 1]. All 1216 patients in
the dataset are randomly split into a training dataset (1000
patients) and a testing dataset (216 patients).
4.2. Classification Evaluation
To validate the superiority of P3SGD in reducing over-
fitting, we compare it with the standard SGD (without
Dropout). We also provide comparisons with the strategy
that combines the standard SGD with Dropout. As a result,
there are three training strategies: SGD, SGD+Dropout, and
P3SGD.
We first evaluate our method on the ResNet-18 architec-
ture [14]. For the standard SGD with Dropout, we insert
Dropout between convolutional layers and set the drop ra-
tio to 0.3 following [47]. To provide a reasonable weight
initialization, we firstly pre-train the CNN model on a pub-
licly available pathological image dataset1. The pre-training
does not take an extra privacy cost, since we do not inter-
act with the original training dataset in this stage. The pre-
training can also help us to determine the hyper-parameters
in Algorithm 1. For P3SGD, we set the total updating
rounds T to 100 and set the noise scale 2 to 0.1 for se-
lecting noisy update. The sampling ratio p is set to 0.1 and
Ωz is set to be {3.0, 1.0}. The Cu and Co are set to 5.0 and
3.0, respectively. To facilitate the discussion, we denote
SGD and P3SGD as the models trained using SGD (with-
out Dropout) and P3SGD (we use the abbreviations in the
following discussions).
From the results of ResNet-18 (Table 1), we observe that
SGD obviously overfits (it even reaches nearly 100% train-
ing accuracy). In contrast, P3SGD drastically decreases
the gap between training and testing accuracies and im-
proves the testing accuracy. In particular, P3SGD outper-
forms SGD by 2.98% in the testing accuracy (a 38.5% rela-
1http://www.andrewjanowczyk.com/use-case-4-lymphocyte-detection/
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Figure 2. The training and testing loss curves of ResNet-18 with
different training strategies. P3SGD significantly reduces the over-
fitting compared to SGD.
tive drop in classification error), while the gap is decreased
from 7.60% to 0.47%, which shows a 93.8% relative im-
provement. These results indicate that P3SGD significantly
reduces the overfitting in the ResNet-18 model compared
with the standard SGD. We also plot the loss curves of
ResNet-18 in Figure 2, which further demonstrates the regu-
larization effect of P3SGD. Besides, there is no significant
performance improvement when we apply Dropout on
ResNet-18. Dropout even leads to a slight decrease (from
92.25% to 92.12%) in testing accuracy. We will discuss this
phenomenon in details in Section 4.4.
Besides the ResNet-18, we also conduct extensive ex-
periments on other popular CNN architectures. In general,
we mainly test on two types of CNN models, namely, tra-
ditional CNNs and modern CNNs 2 (denoted by T and M
in Table 1). Specifically, six architectures are included:
AlexNet [21], VGG-16 [37], ResNet-18 [14], ResNet-
34 [14], MobileNet [15], and MobileNet v2 [34]. For tra-
ditional CNNs (e.g., AlexNet), we insert Dropout between
fully connected (FC) layers and set the drop ratio to 0.5 fol-
lowing [39]. The results are summarized in Table 1. On the
one hand, our method consistently boosts the testing accu-
racy over the standard SGD (without Dropout) on various
2The modern CNN consists of convolutional layers except the final pre-
diction layer, which comprises of a global average pooling and a fully-
connected layer.
CNN architectures. The ResNet-34 trained with P3SGD
achieves the highest testing accuracy at 95.34% among all
network architectures and training strategies. In particular,
P3SGD outperforms Dropout technique on all modern
CNNs, e.g., the testing accuracy gain is 2.12% in the case
of ResNet-34. On the other hand, the training accuracy is
suppressed when we use P3SGD to train the CNN model,
which further leads to a decrease of the gap between train-
ing and testing accuracy.
Despite the superiority of our method, we observe that
Dropout is usually more effective than P3SGD on the
traditional CNNs, e.g., it obtains a slight accuracy gain of
0.45% in the case of VGG-16 compared to P3SGD. We pro-
vide some interpretations in the discussion part. We also no-
tice that, under the standard SGD (without Dropout) train-
ing strategy, the modern CNNs have less overfitting (mea-
sured as the gap between training and testing accuracies)
than traditional CNNs. This may be caused by the regu-
larization effect brought by the Batch Normalization [16]
which exists in the modern CNNs.
4.3. Privacy Cost Analysis
Another advantage of P3SGD is to provide patient-level
privacy within differential privacy. The differentially pri-
vate degree is measured by (, δ) (i.e, privacy cost) in Equa-
tion 1. In this part, we calculate the total spend of privacy
cost via the moments accountant theorem. The target δ is
fixed to
1
|Np|1.1 (Np is the number of patients in the train-
ing set), which is suggested by the previous literature [5]. In
our task, the δ is around 5e− 4 (Np = 1000). To verify the
effectiveness of our proposed strategy for dynamically con-
trolling the noisy update, we compare it with the strategy of
fixed noise scale (marked by 7 in Table 2) which is adopted
by the state-of-the-art works [11, 25]. For simplicity, we
use adaptive and fixed to denote these two strategies.
All the experiments are performed on ResNet-18.
We test on various noise scale sets Ωz to show how
the noise scale affects the performance. We find that
the noise scale greater than 3.0 leads to unstable train-
ing. In practice, we build Ωz using the noise scale from
{1.0, 2.0, 3.0}. Overall, P3SGD with the adaptive strat-
egy (Ωz = {3.0, 1.0}) achieves the best testing accuracy
of 95.23% at a privacy cost of 6.97. For the fixed strat-
egy, a larger noise scale leads to a lower privacy cost, how-
ever, it may cause the noisy update deviating from the de-
cent direction and further hinders the testing accuracy. For
example, setting Ωz to {3.0} leads to the lowest privacy
cost of 4.70 and the worst accuracy of 92.15%, while set-
ting Ωz = {1.0} achieves a better accuracy of 94.38% but
a much higher privacy cost of 8.48. The adaptive strat-
egy provides a reasonable solution for this dilemma of the
fixed strategy.
Adaptive Ωz Testing 
3 {3.0, 1.0} 95.23 6.97
3 {2.0, 1.0} 94.31 7.10
3 {3.0, 2.0} 93.57 4.97
7 {1.0} 94.38 8.48
7 {2.0} 93.24 5.13
7 {3.0} 92.15 4.70
Table 2. Testing accuracy (%) and privacy cost of different settings
on ResNet-18. The Adaptive column indicates if an adaptive noise
scale set (marked by a 3) or a fixed scale (marked by a 7) is used.
Setting a fixed noise scale leads to the method in [11, 25]
Strategy Training Testing Gap
SGD+Dropout 99.63 92.12 7.51
SGD+DropBlock 98.85 94.87 3.68
P3SGD 95.70 95.23 0.47
Table 3. Training and testing accuracies (%) on ResNet-18 with
different regularization strategies.
In general, the adaptive strategy leads to a better
trade off between the privacy cost and the testing accu-
racy. Specifically, extending the fixed scale {z1} or {z2}
to {z1, z2} achieves the testing accuracy higher than or ap-
proaching to the best testing accuracy among the corre-
sponding fixed strategies, while with a reasonable privacy
cost. For instance, the adaptive strategy with {3.0, 1.0}
achieves the accuracy of 95.23%, which is higher than the
fixed strategy with either {3.0} or {1.0}. Our strategy
also outperforms a naive solution by setting the noise scale
to the average of 1.0 and 3.0 (i.e., {2.0}). There is even an
accuracy gain of 0.85% by extending {1.0} to {3.0, 1.0}.
We infer this accuracy gain comes from the stronger reg-
ularization effect brought by the larger noise scale. Mean-
while, the adaptive strategy ({3.0, 1.0}) achieves a mod-
erate privacy cost between the costs obtained by the corre-
sponding fixed strategies (setting Ωz to {1.0} or {3.0}).
To conclude, our proposed strategy can be seen as a sim-
plified version of line search in numerical optimization [27],
and provides a more careful way to control the magnitude
of the added noise. The effectiveness of our strategy comes
from the fine-grained way to control the noisy update.
4.4. Discussions
In this subsection, we first analyze the performance of
different types of CNNs. We then compare P3SGD with
the state-of-the-art regularization mechanism. Finally, we
show that the model trained with P3SGD is resistant to a
model-inversion attack.
Network Architecture. As shown in Table 1, Dropout
and our method P3SGD demonstrate totally different effects
on the two types of CNN architectures (traditional CNNs
and modern CNNs). Specifically, our method outperforms
Dropout on modern CNNs, instead, Dropout is more ef-
Training set
SGD P3SGDOriginal
27.75 27.69
27.7527.78
27.8627.88
G
G
G
27.8427.85
27.86 27.82
27.8027.80
SGD P3SGDOriginal
N
N
N
Testing set
27.7727.73
27.80 27.79
27.8027.79
SGD P3SGDOriginal
G
G
N
Figure 3. Visualization of the model-inversion attack. G/N below each original patch denotes if the patch contains a glomerulus or not.
The number below each reconstructed image is the PSNR value. The reconstructed examples of the training dataset are demonstrated in
the left part. For comparison, we also show some examples from the testing dataset in the right part.
fective on the traditional CNN architectures. This may be
caused by following reasons: (1) Dropout is originally de-
signed for the FC layers due to its huge numbers of param-
eters (e.g., around 90% parameters of VGG-16 are from the
FC layers). However, there is only one FC layer with a few
parameters in modern CNN architectures. (2) The cooper-
ation of Dropout and Batch Normalization can be problem-
atic [16]. As we know, batch normalization layer widely
exists in modern CNNs (e.g, ResNet [14]). (3) Dropout dis-
cards features randomly, however, the features extracted by
convolutional layers are always spatially correlated, which
impedes the use of Dropout on convolutional layers. Some
recent works propose to modify Dropout for convolutional
layers. We compare our method with a variant of Dropout
in the next part.
Other Regularization Techniques. From the previous
discussion, some advanced forms of Dropout should be
adopted in the modern CNN. In this part, we compare our
method with a recent technique, named DropBlock [12],
on ResNet-18. For a fair comparison with Dropout, we
insert DropBlock between every two convolutional layers
and set the drop ratio to 0.3 following [12]. The results are
shown in Table 3. DropBlock achieves a testing accuracy
gain of 2.75% against Dropout, while P3SGD outperforms
both Dropout and DropBlock. In contrast to P3SGD, Drop-
Block has no suppression effect on the training accuracy.
We guess that the performance gain of DropBlock comes
from the effect of the implicit model ensemble. We further
combine P3SGD with DropBlock but do not obtain obvious
accuracy boost.
Model-inversion Attack. To demonstrate that P3SGD is
resistant to the model-inversion attack [24, 23], we perform
an inversion attack on CNN models trained with different
strategies. As a case study, we conduct experiments on the
ResNet-18 and use the output features from the 3-th residual
block to reconstruct the input image (see details in the ap-
pendix). Some visualizations are shown in Figure 3. We can
reconstruct the outline of the tissue in the input image using
the features from the SGD. In contrast, we can not obtain
any valuable information from P3SGD (i.e., the model is
oblivious to training samples). It indicates that SGD is more
vulnerable than P3SGD. Quantitatively, we perform attack
on all the training images and report the average PSNR val-
ues as: 27.82 for P3SGD and 27.84 for SGD. We also con-
duct the same study on patches from the testing dataset and
show some examples in the left part in Figure 3. The results
show that it is hard to reconstruct the input image for both
SGD and P3SGD, since the testing examples are not touched
by the model in the training phase. This provides some cues
for the memorization ability of CNNs [48].
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel SGD schema, named
P3SGD, to regularize the training of deep CNNs while pro-
vide rigorous privacy protection within differential privacy.
P3SGD consistently outperforms SGD on various CNN ar-
chitectures. The key technical innovation lies in the strat-
egy that adaptively controls the noisy update. We con-
duct an analysis and show the effectiveness of this strategy.
We also perform a model-inversion attack and show that the
model trained with P3SGD is resistant to such an attack.
This research paves a new way to regularize deep CNNs
on pathological image analysis with an extra advantage of
appealing patient-level privacy protection. Applying this
method to other types of medical image analysis tasks is
promising and implies a wide range of clinical applications.
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